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Abstract. Some types of weak keys in the Faure–Loidreau (FL) cryp-
tosystem are presented. We show that from such weak keys the private
key can be reconstructed with a computational effort that is substantially
lower than the security level (≈ 225 operations for 80-bit security). The
proposed key-recovery attack is based on ideas of generalized minimum
distance (GMD) decoding for rank-metric codes.
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1 Introduction
Most current public-key cryptosystems like Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA)
[1] rely on hard mathematical problems such as prime factorization problem
or the discrete logarithm problem. In 1999, Shor presented an algorithm for
quantum computers that is able to solve the prime factorization problem and the
discrete logarithm problem in polynomial time [2]. Thus, assuming that quantum
computer of sufficient scale can be built one day, current cryptosystems like
RSA can be broken in polynomial time rendering most of todays communication
systems insecure. Current post-quantum secure public-key cryptosystems, i.e.
systems that are resilient against attacks on quantum computers, suffer from
large public keys compared to RSA, that means typically several hundreds of
thousands of bits [3]. For example, the first code-based cryptosystem by McEliece
[4] uses as a public key an obfuscated generator matrix of a linear block code,
which results in a key size that is quadratic in the length of the code.
In 2006, Faure and Loidreau proposed a cryptosystem [5] that is based on
the problem of reconstructing linearized polynomials. The Faure–Loidreau (FL)
cryptosystem is the rank-metric equivalent of the Augot–Finiasz cryptosystem [6]
and admits very small public keys for a given security level (≈ 2KB for 80-bit
security). In 2018, Gaborit et al. showed, that the private key in the FL cryt-
posystem can be recovered in polynomial time from the public key with high
probability. In [7] it was shown, that the attack from [8] is equivalent to the
problem of list decoding interleaved Gabidulin codes [9]. In other words, the pri-
vate key is a noisy codeword of an interleaved Gabidulin code with error weight
chosen slightly larger then the unique decoding radius. Such noisy codewords
2can be recovered with a high probability by applying list decoding. That means
the size of the list returned by the decoder is one with high probability. When-
ever the list size is larger than one, the decoder fails. This kind of decoding is
called probabilist unique decoding. By restricting to error patterns that make
the probabilistic unique decoder of an interleaved Gabidulin decoder fail, the FL
cryptosystem can be repaired [7].
In this paper, we consider a new method to recover the private key from the
public key in the FL cryptosystem that uses properties that are not related to the
previous key-recovery attacks in [7, 8]. The method uses ideas from generalized
minimum distance (GMD) decoding [10] which improves decoding by trading
errors for erasures and also was applied for rank-metric codes [10, 11]. This
allows to recover private keys from some weak public keys with a computational
complexity that is substantially below the security level of the cryptosystem. We
characterize some types of weak keys and show that the key-recovery attack is
feasible for the parameters suggested in [5, 7].
2 Preliminaries
Let q be a power of a prime and denote by Fq a finite field of order q and by
Fqm the extension field of Fq of degree m. For an integer u > 1, we define an
extension field Fqmu of Fqm such that Fq ⊂ Fqm ⊂ Fqmu . By B = (β1, β2, . . . , βu)
we denote an ordered basis of Fqmu over Fqm .
We denote the set of all m × n matrices over Fq by Fm×nq and define Fnq def=
F1×nq . Matrices and vectors are denoted by bold uppercase and lowercase letters
such as A and a, respectively. The Hamming weight wH(a) of a vector a is
defined as the number of nonzero entries in a.
Under a fixed basis of Fqm over Fq there is a bijective mapping between any
vector a ∈ Fnqm and a corresponding matrix A ∈ Fm×nq . The rank rkq(a) of a
vector a ∈ Fnqm is defined as the rank of the corresponding matrix A ∈ Fm×nq
such that rkq(a)
def
= rkq(A). The field trace of any a ∈ Fqmu to Fqm is denoted
by Trqmu/qm(a). We use Trqmu/qm(a) to denote the element-wise field trace of a
vector a ∈ Fnqmu .
For a given vector a ∈ Fnqm and integer r, the Moore matrix is defined as
Mr(a)
def
=

a1 a2 . . . an
a
[1]
1 a
[1]
2 . . . a
[1]
n
...
...
. . .
...
a
[r−1]
1 a
[r−1]
2 . . . a
[r−1]
n

where [i]
def
= qi denotes the i-th Frobenius power.
32.1 Gabidulin Codes
The rank distance dR between two matrices A,B ∈ Fm×nq with corresponding
vectors a,b ∈ Fnqm is defined as
dR (A,B) = dR (a,b)
def
= rkq(A−B) = rkq(a− b).
A linear rank-metric code of length n ≤ m and dimension k is an Fq-linear
subspace of Fm×nq . The minimum rank distance dR of a rank-metric code of
length n and dimension k is upper bounded by the Singleton-like bound (see [12])
dR ≤ n− k + 1. (1)
Codes that fulfill the Singleton-like bound in (1) with equality are called max-
imum rank distance (MRD) codes [12]. Gabidulin codes are a special class
of rank-metric codes and fulfill (1) with equality, i.e. have minimum distance
dR = n − k + 1, and thus are MRD codes. A Gabidulin [12] code Gab[n, k] of
length n and dimension k over Fqm is defined by the Fqm -linear row space of the
generator matrix
G = Mk(g)
with g ∈ Fnqm and rkq(g) = n.
A rank error channel takes a matrix X ∈ Fm×nq as an input and outputs a
matrix Y ∈ Fm×nq such that
Y = X+E
where the error matrix E ∈ Fm×nq has rank rkq(E) = t.
Besides t rank errors, the transmitted matrix may be corrupted by row- or
column erasures [13]. A matrix X ∈ Fm×nq is corrupted by ρ row erasures and 
column erasures if ρ rows and  columns are erased (i.e. set to zero). There exist
efficient error erasure correcting decoders for Gabidulin codes that can correct t
rank errors,  column erasures and ρ row erasures up to
2t+ ρ+  ≤ n− k (2)
requiring O(n2) operations in Fqm (see [14–16]). Note that  column erasures in
the matrix X ∈ Fq correspond to  symbol erasures in the corresponding vector
x ∈ Fnqm .
2.2 Interleaved Gabidulin Codes
A homogeneous interleaved Gabidulin code IGab[u;n, k] of length n, interleaving
order u and component code dimension k over Fqm is defined as the u-fold
Cartesian product of a (component) Gabidulin code Gab[n, k], i.e.
IGab[u;n, k]
def
=


c(1)
c(2)
...
c(u)
 : c(j) ∈ Gab[n, k],∀j = 1, . . . , u
 .
4An interleaved Gabidulin code IGab[u;n, k] can correct rank errors up to
t ≤ u
u+ 1
(n− k)
with high probability (see e.g. [9, 17, 18]). Note, that interleaving improves the
decoding radius for rank errors but does not improve the decoding radius for
row and column erasures.
Under a fixed basis of Fqmu over Fqm a u-interleaved Gabidulin code IGab[u;n, k]
over Fqm can be represented as the Fqmu -linear row space of the generator matrix
G ∈ Fk×nqm of Gab[n, k].
3 Key-Recovery Attacks on the Faure–Loidreau
Cryptosystem
In the following a brief description of the FL cryptosystem is given. The encryp-
tion and decryption process are described in the Appendix. Let w be an integer
that satisfies ⌊
n− k
2
⌋
< w < n− k.
3.1 Key-Generation
1. Choose g ∈ Fnqm with rkq(g) = n at random and denote by G = Mk(g) the
generator matrix of the corresponding Gabidulin code Gab[n, k].
2. Choose a vector x ∈ Fkqmu such that the last u positions of x are Fqm-linearly
independent at random.
3. Choose s = (s1 s2 . . . sw) ∈ Fwqmu such that rkq(s) = w at random.
4. Choose a random invertible matrix P ∈ Fn×nq and compute
z = ( s |0 )P−1. (3)
Private key: (P, z,x)
Public key: (g, k,kpub, tpub) where
kpub = xG+ z (4)
and
tpub =
⌊
n− k − w
2
⌋
. (5)
3.2 Key-Recovery Attacks on the Faure–Laudreau Cryptosystem
Gaborit, Otmani and Kalachi showed that an alternative private key k′pub can
be recovered in polynomial time from the public key kpub and G with high
probability if
w ≤ u
u+ 1
(n− k) (6)
5holds [8]. The attack cannot be prevented by adjusting the parameters, e.g. by
choosing w > uu+1 (n − k), since w reduces tpub (see (5)) such that decoding
attacks become feasible.
Consider the public key kpub from (4) where x ∈ Fkqmu and z ∈ Fnqmu
with rkq(z) = w. By defining kpub =
∑u
i=1 k
(i)
pubβi, z =
∑u
i=1 z
(i)βi and x =∑u
i=1 x
(i)βi we can express the public key as
k
(1)
pub
k
(2)
pub
...
k
(u)
pub
 =

x(1)G
x(2)G
...
x(u)G
+

z(1)
z(2)
...
z(u)
 (7)
where x(j) ∈ Fkqm and k(j)pub, z(j) ∈ Fnqm with rkq(z(j)) ≤ w for all j = 1, . . . , u.
Note, that the public key in (7) is a codeword of an interleaved Gabidulin code
IGab[u;n, k] over Fqm that is corrupted by an error of rank w.
Recently, Wachter-Zeh et al. showed that the key-recovery attack from [8] is
equivalent to the decoding problem of an interleaved Gabidulin code [7, Thm. 3],
i.e. to the problem of recovering x(1), . . . ,x(u) and z(1), . . . , z(u) from (7). Hence,
an attacker can reconstruct an alternative private key by running an interleaved
decoder on the public key kpub, which is possible since the generator matrix G
of the component codes is public.
This observation provides an explicit repair of the FL system by choosing
the error vectors z(j) for j = 1, . . . , u in the key generation step (see Section 3.1)
such that a probabilistic unique interleaved Gabidulin decoder fails although w
satisfies (6). The most secure choice for z in (7) is such that z(1) = z(2) = · · · =
z(u) with rkq(z
(j)) = w for all j = 1, . . . , u. The number of keys is still large
enough by restricting to error vectors of this form [7]. Hence, the cryptosystem
can be repaired by constructing the component error vectors of z in (3) as
z(j) = (s(1)|0)P−1 ∀j = 1, . . . , u
with s(1) ∈ Fwqm and rkq(s(1)) = w. The parameters of the repaired FL system
as in [7] are given in Table 1.
4 A GMD-based Key-Recovery Attack
In this section we present a new attack on the repaired FL cryptosystem that
allows to recover the private key of some weak public keys efficiently. The attack
is based on the principle of GMD decoding [10]. The general idea of GMD de-
coding is to incorporate soft information (e.g. from the communication channel)
in the bounded minimum distance (BMD) decoding process by erasing the most
unreliable positions. This results in an improved error correction performance,
since a BMD decoder can correct twice more erasures than errors. The principle
of GMD decoding can be extended to rank-metric codes [11], where rank errors
6can be traded for row and column erasures (see (2)). An erasure in the case of
rank-metric codes can occur either row and/or column wise in the corresponding
codeword matrix. That means the entries in one or more rows and/or columns
are erased but the positions of the rows and columns are known.
Although an attacker is not provided with soft information about the error
vector z that obfuscates the private information about the public key (4), we
show that a GMD-based key-recovery attack that exploits the improved correc-
tion capability for row and column erasures is feasible for some error patterns
z, even if all possible combinations of row and column erasure positions need to
be considered. The knowledge of z allows to recover x by computing
x = (kpub − z)G†
where G† is the right inverse of the generator matrix G. Hence, an alternative
private key (P˜,x, z) can be obtained by computing an invertible matrix P˜ ∈
Fn×nq satisfying
zP =
(
s˜(1)|0
)
with s˜(1) ∈ Fwqm and rkq(s˜(1)) = w. Since one z(j) in (7) is sufficient to recover
the whole error vector z in the repaired FL system, we focus on the first row of
the expanded public key in (7), i.e.
k
(1)
pub = x
(1)G+ z(1) with rkq(z
(1)) = w.
A straightforward decoding approach using a BMD Gabidulin decoder for the
code Gab[n, k] with generator matrix G will fail since w = rkq (z
(1)) is chosen
such that w > (n − k)/2. We define the excess of the error rank w over the
unique decoding radius as
ξ
def
= w − n− k
2
. (8)
Recall, that for Gabidulin codes there exist algorithms [13,14,16] that can correct
δ = + ρ row and column erasures and errors of rank w up to (see (2))
2w + δ ≤ n− k.
By artificially imposing δ row and column erasures on k
(1)
pub and thus on the
error vector z(1), one obtains a new error vector z′(1) with w′ def= rkq (z′
(1)
) ≤ w.
Thus, an error and row/column erasure decoder can successfully decode if
2w′ + δ ≤ n− k. (9)
Using (8), (9) and the fact that w − δ ≤ w′ ≤ w, we obtain1
2ξ ≤ δ ≤ n− k. (10)
1 Note, that by definition 2ξ is always an integer (see (8)).
7Let DecG (·) denote an efficient error erasure decoding algorithm for the Gabidulin
code Gab[n, k] characterized by the generator matrix G that returns an estimate
xˆ(1)G of the “transmitted” codeword x(1)G ∈ Gab[n, k].
We define the set Iδ of row and column erasure patterns as
Iδ def= {(a,b) : a ∈ Fm2 ,b ∈ Fn2 with wH(a) + wH(b) = δ}
where the nonzero entries in a and b indicate the row and column erasure posi-
tions and wH(·) denotes the Hamming weight of a binary vector.
For any matrix Y ∈ Fm×nq let E(a,b)(Y) denote the row and column erasure
operator that returns the matrix Y ∈ Fm×nq where the rows and columns are
erased (i.e. set to zero) according to the erasure pattern (a,b). We may also
use the operator E(a,b)(y) on the corresponding vector y ∈ Fnqm . Algorithm 1
summarizes the proposed GMD-based key-recovery attack.
Algorithm 1: A GMD-based Key-Recovery Attack
Input : k
(1)
pub,G, w, Iδ, Nmax
Output: xˆ(1), zˆ(1) with rkq(zˆ
(1)) = w s.t. xˆ(1)G+ zˆ(1) = k
(1)
pub or “failure”
1 foreach i ∈ [1, Nmax] do
2 foreach δ ∈ [2ξ, n− k] do
3 Pick an erasure pattern (a,b) uniformly at random from Iδ
4 cˆ(1) ← DecG
(E(a,b)(kpub))
5 if cˆ(1) 6= ∅ then
6 xˆ(1) ← cˆ(1)G†
7 z(1) ← k(1)pub − xˆ(1)G
8 if rkq z
(1) = w then
9 return x(1), z(1)
10 return “failure”
In some cases the rank w of the error z(1) is not reduced enough by the δ
artificial row and column erasures on k
(1)
pub such that (9) is not satisfied. In this
case we either get a miscorrection (i.e. decoder returns an estimate cˆ(1) 6= c(1))
or a decoding failure (DecG (·) = ∅). Line 8 detects miscorrections that lead to
codewords cˆ(1) that are not at rank distance w from kpub.
2
The worst-case computational complexity of the attack in Algorithm 1 is
on the order of |Iδ|O(n2) operations in Fqm . The codes considered for the FL
cryptosystem are rather short (see Table 1). That means it is computationally
2 There may be estimates cˆ(1) at rank distance w from kpub such that cˆ
(1) 6= c(1).
However, this event is very unlikely since ξ is very small for the considered parameters
(see Table 1) and was not observed in our simulations.
8affordable to iterate through all possible erasure patterns with δ row and column
erasures which are satisfying (10). Algorithm 1 can be parallalized to improve
the runtime of the attack.
We say that the attack in Algorithm 1 is successful if the algorithm out-
puts xˆ(1), zˆ(1) (not “failure”). This means, that there exists an erasure pattern
incorporating δ row and column erasures such that (9) is satisfied.
5 Classification of Weak Keys
In this section we classify some types of weak keys, in particular the correspond-
ing error vectors z(1), that are vulnerable against the key-recovery attack in
Algorithm 1.
Let the invertible matrix P−1 ∈ Fn×nq in (3) be partitioned such that
P−1 =
(
P1
P2
)
with matrices P1 ∈ Fw×nq and P2 ∈ F(n−w)×nq having full rank. Then by (3) we
have that
z(1) = s(1)P1. (11)
Since P1 is of full rank we can decompose it as
P1 = A · [Iw×w |Q] ·B (12)
where A ∈ Fw×wq is of full rank and B ∈ Fn×nq is a permutation matrix.
In the following we restrict to column erasure attacks only (i.e. δ = ) and
describe weak keys by the structure of Q. The decomposition in (12) of P1 is in
general not unique. By “weak keys” we refer to error vectors z(1) of the form (11)
for which there exists a decomposition (12) of P1 with Q having a structure as
described in the following subsections. Note, that by writing (11) over Fq we get
similar arguments for row erasures on the rows of the corresponding matrix S(1)
of the vector s(1).
5.1 Rank Equal to Hamming Weight Error Patterns
The rank of z(1) is equal to its Hamming weight, i.e. rkq(z
(1)) = wH(z), if Q
in (12) is the allzero matrix (Q = 0). A necessary condition for the success of
Algorithm 1 is that the erasure pattern for the column erasures at a certain
iteration is chosen such that (9) holds. Let us denote by S,1 such an event for
a specific number of column erasures  given that the error vector z(1) has rank
equal to its Hamming weight. For this special case we can compute the success
probability as
Pr(S,1) =
min(,w)∑
i=dξ+/2e
(
w
i
)(
n− w
− i
)
(
n

) (13)
9where the denominator is the number of all possible column erasure patterns
for a given  and the numerator is the sum of the number of events for which i
many errors are traded for erasures. The maximum number of errors that can
be traded for erasures is min(, w). The minimum amount of errors that need
to be traded for erasures such that (9) holds is dξ + /2e, which we obtain by
inserting the relation w′ = w − i into (9) and using the definition of ξ from (8).
The probability Pr(S,1) for the 80-bit security parameters proposed in [7] is
shown in Figure 1.
5.2 η-Weak Error Patterns
The weakness of the keys described by an allzero matrix Q comes from the fact
that whenever one of the w nonzero entries in z is hit by an erasure the rank
of z is reduced by one. The number of these events is considerably high (see
numerator of (13)), even for error patterns that can be decomposed as in (12)
with a matrix Q having a certain amount of allzero rows. Let η denote the
fraction of allzero rows in Q, i.e. η = N0/w, where N0 is the number of allzero
rows in Q. Clearly, for η = 1 we have that wH(z
(1)) = rkq(z
(1)). The success
probability of Algorithm 1 for keys with η < 1, which we refer to as η-weak error
patterns, depends on the remaining nonzero entries of Q.
Based on (13) we derive a lower bound on the success probability by assuming
that only the positions in z(1) that are related to the allzero rows of Q are the
cause for the rank reduction of z. Let S,η denote the event that in a certain
iteration of Algorithm 1 an erasure pattern with  columns erasures such that (9)
holds is picked, given that z(1) is an η-weak error pattern. The probability of
S,η can be lower bounded by
Pr(S,η) ≥ P (, η) def=
min(,wη)∑
i=dξ+/2e
(
wη
i
)(
n− wη
− i
)
(
n

) (14)
that is the cumulative sum of a hypergeometric distribution.
The tightness of the lower bound P (, η) in (14) is validated by simulations for
different η-weak error patterns z(1) for the 80-bit security parameters from [7].
The simulation results are illustrated in Figure 1. The success rates for the
smallest possible η for different security levels are given in Table 1.
5.3 Further Weak Error Patterns
Simulation results show that there exist further error patterns that are different
from the previously characterized patterns and can be recovered by Algorithm 1.
In particular, another class of weak keys is characterized by matrices Q with
rkq (Q)  min(w, n− w). Figure 2 shows the simulations results of the success
rate over  for matrices Q with rkqQ = 1 and rkqQ = 2 that do not correspond
to η error patterns with η > 0.
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Fig. 1. Conditional success rate and success probability of a column erasure attack
according to Algorithm 1 for η-weak error patterns with different values of η using the
parameters proposed in [7] for the 80-bit security level. For each value of η and  the
simulation results were obtained by Monte Carlo Simulations running 2 · 106 iterations
and choosing in every iteration a random η-weak error pattern z(1) with rkq(z
(1)) = w
and Q having wη allzero rows.
Table 1. Parameters for the repaired FL cryptosystem in [7] and the corresponding
probabilities for η-weak error patterns with η = 2ξ/w and a column erasure attack
with  = 2ξ column erasures.
Security Level q m u n k w Key Size ξ log2(Pr(S2ξ,2ξ/w))
80-bit 2 61 3 61 31 16 1.86 KB 1 -10.82
128-bit 2 63 3 63 31 18 1.98 KB 2 -19.16
256-bit 2 82 4 82 48 20 4.20 KB 3 -28.36
6 Conclusions
A new key-recovery attack on the Faure–Loidreau (FL) system was presented.
The attack uses ideas from generalized minimum distance (GMD) decoding of
rank-metric codes to recover private keys from some weak public keys. Some
families of weak keys were classified and analyzed.
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Fig. 2. Conditional success rate and success probability of a column erasure attack
according to Algorithm 1 for weak keys with Q of low rank and having no allzero
rows. The parameters proposed in [7] for the 80-bit security level are used. For each
value of  the simulation results were obtained by Monte Carlo simulations runing 2·106
iterations and choosing in every iteration a random error vector z(1) with rkq(z
(1)) = w
and rkq(Q) ∈ {1, 2}. The probability of success Pr(S,η=1) for error patterns with
Hamming weight equal to their rank weight is plotted as a reference.
We showed, that for the current parameters, the private keys of some weak
public keys can be recovered with an effort which is substantially lower than the
security level of the cryptosystem. The classification of all weak keys that are
vulnerable to the attack presented in this paper is still an open problem and
subject to further research. That means we require that by generating a random
public key as proposed in the FL cryptosystem the probability of picking a weak
key that is affected by the attack is within the proposed security level.
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A Appendix
A.1 Encryption
Let m = (m1 m2 . . . mk−u | 0 . . . 0) ∈ Fkqm be the plaintext.
1. Choose an element α ∈ Fqmu at random.
2. Choose e ∈ Fnqm with rkq(e) ≤ tpub at random.
3. Compute the ciphertext c ∈ Fnqm as
c = mG+ Trqmu/qm(αkpub) + e.
A.2 Decryption
1. Compute
cP = mGP+ Trqmu/qm(αkpub)P+ eP.
Due to the Fqm-linearity of the trace we have
Trqmu/qm(αkpub)P = Trqmu/qm(αx)GP+ (Trqmu/qm(αs) |0)
and get
cP = (m+ Trqmu/qm(αx))GP+ (Trqmu/qm(αs) |0) + eP.
2. Define G′P as the last n − w columns of the product GP and let c′ and e′
be the last n− w positions of c and eP, respectively. Then we have that
c′ = (m+ Trqmu/qm(αx))G′P + e
′
with rkq(e
′) ≤ tpub =
⌊
n−k−w
2
⌋
.
Since G′P is a generator matrix of Gab[n − w, k] we can decode to remove
e′ and get
m′ = m+ Trqmu/qm(αx).
3. Since m = (m1 m2 . . . mk−u | 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
u
) we have that the last u positions of
m′ are
m′i = Trqmu/qm(αxi), ∀i = k − u+ 1, . . . , k.
Since X def= (xk−u+1, . . . , xk) forms an ordered basis of Fqmu over Fqm we
can compute α as
α =
k∑
i=k−u+1
Trqmu/qm(αxi)x
⊥
i =
k∑
i=k−u+1
m′ix
⊥
i ,
where X⊥ def= (x⊥k−u+1, . . . , x⊥k ) denotes the dual basis of X . Finally, we can
recover the plaintext as
m = m′ − Trqmu/qm(αx).
